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Abstract. Authentication protocols are constructed using certain fun-
damental security mechanisms. This paper discusses how the properties
of the underlying mechanisms aect the design of authentication pro-
tocols. We rstly illustrate factors aecting the selection of protocols
generally. These factors include the properties of the environment for
authentication protocols and the resources of the authenticating entities.
We then consider a number of authentication protocols which are based
on mechanisms satisfying dierent conditions than those required for the
ISO/IEC 9798 protocols, in particular the use of non-random nonces and
the provision of identity privacy for the communicating parties.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the fundamental security mechanisms which are
used to construct entity authentication protocols, and how the strength of these
mechanisms aects protocol design. For the purposes of this paper, the mech-
anisms are divided into two categories, cryptographic mechanisms and time
variant parameters (TVPs). The rst category includes symmetric encryption,
digital signatures, cryptographic check functions (CCFs) and zero knowledge
techniques. The second includes clocks for timestamping, nonce generators and
sequence numbers. An authentication protocol is typically constructed using at
least one mechanism from both categories.
When a new protocol is needed in a particular environment, the designer must
rst discover what mechanisms are available. For implementation reasons there
may be limits on available mechanisms, because every mechanism has particular
properties corresponding to the particular environment in which the protocol
works. In such a case, the protocol must meet the needs of the environment and
be tailored to the `strength' of the available mechanisms.
A variety of entity authentication protocols
2
have recently been standardised
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The four published parts of ISO/IEC
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They are referred to as entity authentication mechanisms in ISO/IEC documents.
9798 cover the general model (9798-1, [1]), authentication protocols based on
symmetric encipherment (9798-2, [3]), authentication protocols based on pub-
lic key algorithms (9798-3, [2]), and authentication protocols based on CCFs
(9798-4, [4]). A fth part of ISO/IEC 9798, covering authentication protocols
using zero knowledge techniques, is currently at CD stage [5]. The ISO/IEC
9798 protocols use TVPs, e.g. timestamps, nonces and sequence numbers, to
prevent valid authentication information from being accepted at a later time.
The protocols proposed in ISO/IEC 9798 have all been designed to use mech-
anisms meeting rather stringent requirements, which may be dicult to meet in
some practical environments. Hence in this paper we look at alternatives to the
ISO/IEC 9798 protocols which are still sound even when the mechanisms do not
meet such `strong' conditions.
The discussion starts in Section 2 with an illustration of factors which aect
protocol selection, including the properties of the environment for an authenti-
cation protocol, and the resources of the authenticating entities. We then look at
the ISO/IEC 9798 protocols in the context of requirements on the mechanisms.
In Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, we consider possible alternatives to the ISO/IEC
9798 schemes, which do not put such strict conditions on the mechanisms. In
the nal section, we give a summary of the contributions of this paper.
2 Factors aecting protocol selection
We now discuss two important factors which aect protocol design, namely the
properties of the protocol environment and the resources of the authenticating
entities. As we show in subsequent sections, if the environment and entity re-
sources for authentication satisfy less stringent conditions than those required
for the ISO/IEC 9798 protocols, then the ISO/IEC 9798 protocols cannot be
used, and a dierent protocol, tailored to match the properties of the underlying
mechanisms, needs to be designed.
2.1 Properties of the environment for protocols
Before considering what underlying mechanisms are available and selecting a
protocol which uses them, the designer must know the environment in which the
protocol will work. A particular environment may impose stringent requirements
on the mechanisms and the protocol itself. For the purposes of this paper we
consider the following aspects of the environment of an authentication protocol.
Communications channel.Communications channels are used to transmit
messages during the process of authentication. The major property of interest
here is whether a channel is broadcast or point-to-point.
 Broadcast channel, where there exist messages from a variety of senders
and/or for a variety of receivers. Typically, to make a broadcast channel
operate correctly, the sender's and/or receiver's names have to be sent across
the channel.
 Point-to-point channel, where the channel is reserved for a particular sender
and receiver who both know the initiator and terminator of each message,
so that their names do not need to be sent across the channel.
Other properties of the communications channel which aect the design of
authentication protocol include whether or not interceptors can modifymessages
and/or introduce totally spurious messages. However we do not address these
issues in detail here.
Entity identier. The major property of interest here is which entities are
authorised to know a particular entity identier during the process of authen-
tication. There are two main cases of interest, namely that the identier of an
entity is allowed to be transferred in clear text (e.g., ISO/IEC 9798 parts 2, 3 and
4) or that it is only allowed to be known to particular entities (e.g., [6, 13, 17]).
Trust relationship.The trust relationship describes whether one entity be-
lieves that the other entities will follow the protocol specications correctly (e.g.
[14]). The trust relationship of particular interest here is between authentication
servers and clients. For instance, a client may not trust an individual server [9].
2.2 Resources of authenticating entities
We consider the following aspects of the resources of the authenticating entities.
Knowledge. An entity might have dierent kinds of knowledge at the start
of authentication, namely shared secret information with another entity, private
information (e.g. the private part of the entity's own asymmetric key pair),
reliable public information (e.g. the public part of another entity's asymmetric
key pair), or no knowledge of another entity.
Computational ability. The entities may or may not have the computa-
tional ability to perform certain operations, namely computation of complex
cryptographic algorithms (e.g. a digital signature algorithm), random and se-
cure generation of a key or an oset for a key, and generation of predictable or
unpredictable nonces.
Time synchronisation.The entities may or may not have access to securely
synchronised clocks or synchronised sequence numbers.
3 Absence of trust in individual third parties
We consider a situation where two entities, who share no secret based on sym-
metric cryptography or hold no public information based on asymmetric cryp-
tography, want to complete unilateral or mutual authentication. Typically they
will have to get assistance from a third party, referred to as an authentication
server. However, in some environments, these clients have no reason to trust an
individual server, and in such a case the ISO/IEC 9798 protocols cannot be used
directly. In order to design a protocol which does not require trust in individual
servers, a range of possible approaches can be followed.
Firstly, a client can choose which from a set of servers to trust, typically
by applying a security policy or considering their history of performance and
reliability. Yahalom et al. [21] proposed a protocol which allows a client or his
agent to make such a choice. A limitation of this scheme is that a client may
sometimes nd it dicult to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy
servers.
Secondly, a set of moderately trusted servers who are trusted by users col-
lectively, but not individually, can be used. Gong [11] proposed a protocol with
multiple servers such that a minority of malicious and colluding servers cannot
compromise security or disrupt service. In that protocol two clients participate
in choosing a session key, and each relevant server is responsible for converting
and distributing a part of the session key. Two variations on this approach have
been described in [9]. In both variants the servers each generate a part of a ses-
sion key, which can be successfully established between a pair of entities as long
as more than half the servers are trustworthy. Both schemes from [9] have the
advantage of requiring considerably fewer messages than Gong's protocol.
A third approach, based on asymmetric cryptography, is to separate transfer
of authentication information from issue of authentication information, i.e. to
let the issuer be o-line. One instance of this approach is where a master server
(sometimes called the certication authority) issues a certicate which is then
held by another on-line secondary server. The certicate is valid for a period of
time, during which there is no need to further contact the master server, since
the certicate is available from the secondary server. The client does not need
to trust the secondary server, but does need to trust the o-line master server.
4 Entity identity privacy
During authentication, the identities of the entities concerned may need to be
sent across the communications channel, either embedded within or alongside
the protocol messages. There are two main reasons why this may be necessary.
{ Depending on the nature of the communications channel, all messages may
need to have one or more addresses attached. More specically, if a broadcast
channel is being used, then, in order for recipients to detect the messages
intended for them, a recipient address must be attached. In addition, many
authentication protocols require the recipient of a protocol message to know
the identity of the entity which (claims to have) originated it, so that it can
be processed correctly (e.g. deciphered using the appropriate key). If this
information is not available, as would typically be the case in a broadcast
environment, then the originator address also needs to be attached.
{ Certain authentication protocols, including some of those in ISO/IEC 9798,
require the recipient's name to be included within the protected part of
some of the messages, in order to protect the protocol against certain types
of attack.
However, depending on the nature of the communications channel, communicat-
ing entities may require a level of anonymity, which would prevent their name
and/or address being sent across the channel (except in enciphered form). For
example, in a mobile telecommunications environment, it may be important for
users that their identiers are not sent in clear across the radio path, since that
would reveal their location to an interceptor of the radio communications.
Of the two reasons listed for sending names across the channel, the second is
usually simpler to deal with, since alternative protocols can typically be devised
which do not require the inclusion of names in protocol messages; for example,
as described in ISO/IEC 9798{4, `unidirectional keys' can be employed. We
therefore focus our attention on the anonymity problems arising from the use of
authentication protocols in broadcast environments. It is important to note that
these anonymity problems are not dealt with in any published part of ISO/IEC
9798.
There are two main approaches to providing entity anonymity in broadcast
channels, i.e., the use of temporary identities which change at regular intervals,
and the use of asymmetric (public key) encipherment techniques. We now discuss
three examples which make use of these approaches. In each case we consider a
`many-to-one' broadcast scenario, where many mobile users communicate with
a single `base' entity. In this case anonymity is typically only required for the
mobile users who can only receive from the base, and hence there may be no
need for the base address to be sent across the channel.
First observe that in GSM (Global System for Mobile Telecommunication)
[13], temporary identities (TMSIs) are transmitted over the air interface instead
of permanent identities (IMSIs). TMSIs are changed on each location update and
on certain other occasions as dened by the network. A mobile user identies
himself by sending the old TMSI during each location update process, which
has to be sent before authentication takes place and must therefore be sent
unencrypted. However, the new TMSI is returned after authentication has been
completed and a new session key has been generated so that it can be, and is,
transmitted encrypted. In certain exceptional cases, including initial location
registration, the user has to identify itself using its IMSI. In these cases an
intruder may be able to obtain the IMSI from the GSM air interface. Thus the
GSM system only provides a limited level of anonymity for mobile users.
Second consider a mutual authentication protocol, also outlined in [17], which
has been designed for possible adoption by two third generation mobile systems,
namely UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) and FPLMTS
(Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunication Systems). Like the GSM solu-
tion, this scheme also uses temporary identities to provide identity and location
privacy. However, in this protocol, temporary identities are used at every authen-
tication exchange including the case of a new registration, so that permanent
identities are never transmitted in clear text.
The principals involved in this protocol are one of number of users, A, a
single `base' entity B and an authentication server S. The protocol makes use
of two types of temporary identities: S-identities shared by A and S, including
a current I
A
and a new I
0
A
, and B-identities shared by A and B, also including
a current J
A
and a new J
0
A
. There are two versions of the protocol, depending
on whether or not A and B already share a valid temporary B-identity J
A
and
secret key K
AB
. The protocol makes use of ve cryptographic check functions
F1 - F5, each of which takes a key and a data string as input. Note also that 
denotes bit-wise exclusive-or.
Version 1: A and B share K
AB
and J
A
. Then the message exchanges are as
follows (where M
i
: A ! B : x means that the ith exchanged message is sent
from A to B and contains data x).
M
1
: A! B : J
A
; R
A
M
2
: B ! A : R
B
; F4
K
AB
(R
A
) J
0
A
; F3
K
AB
(R
B
; R
A
; J
0
A
)
M
3
: A! B : F3
K
AB
(R
A
; R
B
)
Version 2: A and B share no secret, A and S share K
AS
and I
A
, and B and
S have a secure channel which is available for exchanging messages 2 and 3.
M
1
: A! B : I
A
; R
A
M
2
: B ! S : I
A
; R
A
M
3
: S ! B : F1
K
AS
(R
A
)  I
0
A
; O;K
AB
; F3
K
AS
(I
0
A
; R
A
; O)
M
4
: B ! A : F1
K
AS
(R
A
)  I
0
A
; O; F3
K
AS
(I
0
A
; R
A
; O); R
B
;
F4
K
AB
(R
B
) J
0
A
; F3
K
AB
(R
B
; R
A
; J
0
A
)
M
5
: A! B : F3
K
AB
(R
A
; R
B
)
where O is a key oset so that K
AB
= F2
K
AS
(O;B). The resulting session key
is K
0
AB
= F5
K
AB
(R
A
; R
B
; J
0
A
).
Our third example is based on the use of asymmetric encipherment. In this
case, no temporary sender identity is required in the rst message because the
real sender identity can be encrypted using the public encipherment transfor-
mation of the receiver. In order to keep the receiver identity condential, a
temporary receiver identity is needed. In this example, A is one of a number
of users of a single broadcast channel which is used for communicating with a
single `base' entity B, E
X
denotes public key encipherment using the public key
of entity X and H denotes a hash-function. The messages are:
M
1
: A! B : E
B
(A;R
A
; R
0
A
)
M
2
: B ! A : R
0
A
; E
A
(R
B
; R
A
; B)
M
3
: A! B : H(R
A
; R
B
; A)
where the nonce R
0
A
is a temporary identier for A, which should be unpre-
dictable for any third parties. In this protocol, the nonces R
A
and R
B
are used
to meet two requirements, namely to verify the freshness of messages by using
a challenge-response scheme and, possibly, to establish a session key shared be-
tween A and B. These nonces have to be unpredictable as well. Note also that A
and B must have reliable copies of each other's public keys before starting the
protocol.
5 Avoiding abuse of digital signatures
During authentication based on digital signatures with `unpredictable' nonces,
entity A typically challenges entity B by sending a nonce R
A
. B then sends
A a signature-based message containing this nonce in reply to the challenge.
By choosing the nonce appropriately A may be able to use B's signature for
malicious purposes.
Here, as throughout this paper, a digital signature function is dened to
include use of either a hash-function or a redundancy function to prevent an
impersonator claiming that a randomly chosen value is actually a signature.
The authentication protocols of ISO/IEC 9798-3 [2] discuss means of dealing
with this problem, and to help avoid the worst consequences a nonce chosen
by the signer can also be included in the relevant signature. However, the same
problem may still exist. We now consider a protocol given in Clause 5.2.2 of
ISO/IEC 9798-3 (see also [18]).
M
1
: B ! A : R
B
; D
1
M
2
: A! B : CertA;R
A
; R
B
; B;D
3
; S
A
(R
A
; R
B
; B;D
2
)
M
3
: B ! A : CertB;R
B
; R
A
; A;D
5
; S
B
(R
B
; R
A
; A;D
4
)
Note that D
1
- D
5
are (application dependent) data strings, S
X
denotes the
signature function of entity X, R
A
and R
B
are nonces, and CertX denotes the
certicate of entity X. R
A
is present in the signed part ofM
2
to prevent B from
obtaining the signature of A on data chosen by B. SimilarlyR
B
is present in the
signed part of M
3
. However, this approach cannot completely avoid the abuse
of signatures for the following two reasons.
1. Although both nonces are included in both signatures, B selects its nonce
before A. This means that A is in a more favourable position than B to
misuse the other party's signature. To prevent this, B can generate an extra
nonce and add it into the signed message, e.g. in M
3
a nonce R
0
B
can be
included in D
4
and D
5
:
M
3
: B ! A : CertB;R
B
; R
A
; A;R
0
B
; D
0
5
; S
B
(R
B
; R
A
; A;R
0
B
; D
0
4
):
2. It is possible for users of the signatures to `bypass' some nonces involved
in the protocol if other signatures in dierent contexts use nonces in the
same way. For example, a dierent protocol might make use of a message
S
A
(R;X;B;D
2
) or S
B
(R; Y;A;D
4
), where R is a random number and X or
Y has a particular meaning. The signatures of the previous protocol could
then potentially be successfully abused in this protocol.
The above discussion implies that changing protocol construction only makes
abuse of digital signatures more dicult, and cannot protect against such at-
tacks completely, because the protocol itself cannot detect the misuse of digital
signatures involved. However, there exist means of avoiding these problems, such
as the following.
 `Key separation' is a well known and widely used technique, i.e. using dif-
ferent keys for dierent applications (see, e.g. [18]).
 Another approach is using sequence numbers rather than unpredictable nonces
to control the uniqueness of authentication exchanges. Because the values of
the sequence numbers are agreed by both the claimant and verier, neither
party to a protocol can be persuaded to sign information which has some
`hidden meaning'.
 Last, but not least, observe that zero knowledge protocols are specically
designed to prevent this type of attack because they do not generate digital
signatures. However, as Bengio et al. pointed out, these protocols are still
open to interactive abuse through middleperson attacks [8]. It is then left to
the implementation to ensure that those attacks are not feasible in practice.
6 Predictable and unpredictable nonces
The nonce-based protocols specied in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of ISO/IEC 9798 all
require the nonces used to be unpredictable, i.e. the nonces must be generated
in such a way that intercepting third parties cannot guess future nonce values.
However, in some circumstances it may be necessary to use nonces which are
predictable, i.e. generated using a deterministic process known to the interceptor.
For example, it may be dicult for an entity to generate random or unpredictable
pseudo-random numbers, particularly if the entity is implemented in a portable
device, such as a smart card, and use of a simple counter for nonce generation
may be the only practical possibility.
We now consider how secure nonce-based authentication protocols can be de-
vised even if the nonces are predictable (as long as they are still `one time'). This
can be achieved by cryptographically protecting all the messages in a protocol
including the nonces.
Before proceeding we briey distinguish between predictable nonces and se-
quence numbers, both of which are used to control the uniqueness of messages.
They are both used only once within a valid period of time and there is the
possibility that they can be predicted in advance by a third party. However, a
predictable nonce is used as a challenge, so that the responder does not need to
know it before receiving it and to record it after using it. On the other hand, a
sequence number is agreed by the claimant and verier beforehand according to
some policy, and will be rejected if it is not in accordance with the agreed policy.
Furthermore, use of sequence numbers may require additional `book keeping'
for both the claimant and verier. Typically every entity will need to store a
`send' sequence number and a `receive' sequence number for each other entity
with which they communicate.
It has been observed in [12] that in a protocol using symmetric encryption
with a nonce, if the nonce is unpredictable then either the challenge or the re-
sponse can be transmitted unencrypted; however if the nonce is predictable then
both the challenge and response have to be encrypted. Otherwise the protocol
cannot protect against replay attacks.
We now illustrate that this logic also applies to protocols using digital sig-
natures and CCFs. The following example shows how digital signatures can be
used in conjunction with a predictable nonce to produce a secure authentication
protocol. This is a modication of the protocol given in Clause 5.2.2 of [2] (the
notation is as used previously).
M
1
: B ! A : CertB;R
B
; S
B
(R
B
)
M
2
: A! B : CertA;R
A
; S
A
(R
A
; R
B
; B)
M
3
: B ! A : S
B
(R
B
; R
A
; A)
Another example, this time based on the use of a CCFF, is the following
modication of the protocol given in Clause 5.2.2 of [4].
M
1
: B ! A : R
B
; F
K
(R
B
)
M
2
: A! B : R
A
; F
K
(R
A
; R
B
; B)
M
3
: B ! A : F
K
(R
B
; R
A
)
The above analysis means that there is a good range of protocols available
to support both unpredictable and predictable nonces. Note that when using
a predictable nonce as a challenge, since a future challenge is predictable to
the responder, the verier of the challenge has to depend on the honesty and
competence of the responder [12].
7 Disclosure of plaintext/ciphertext pairs
There are a number of dierent models for known plaintext attacks, chosen plain-
text attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks on cipher systems (e.g. [7] and [10]).
Although obtaining plaintext/ciphertext pairs far from guarantees that attacks
will be successful, it is typically the necessary rst step for an attacker. Whether
or not the attacker has access to a plaintext/ciphertext pair during authentica-
tion depends on the nature of the communications channel, the authentication
protocol, and the details of the cryptographic processing.
We use the term `plaintext/ciphertext pair' rather loosely here, to cover
matching pairs of input and output for a variety of cryptographic algorithms,
including encipherment algorithms, digital signatures and cryptographic check
functions. Whether or not disclosing a plaintext/ciphertext pair is a problem
depends on the strength of the algorithm, and whether the same algorithm and
key are used for applications other than the authentication exchange.
In some situations the disclosure of plaintext/ciphertext pairs is not a security
problem and that is what ISO/IEC 9798 assumes. However we are concerned
here with situations where disclosure of pairs may be a security threat, and we
consider ways of avoiding the threat. The following unilateral authentication
protocols are given in ISO/IEC 9798 parts 2, 3 and 4.
Example 1: Symmetric encryption with nonce [3]:
M
1
: B ! A : R
B
; D
1
M
2
: A! B : D
3
; E
K
AB
(R
B
; B;D
2
)
Example 2: Digital signature with timestamp [2]:
M
1
: A! B : T
A
; B;D
1
; S
A
(T
A
; B;D
2
)
Example 3: CCF with sequence number [4]:
M
1
: A! B : N
A
; B;D
1
; F
K
AB
(N
A
; B;D
2
)
The rst protocol is based on symmetric encryption. It depends on the op-
tional text eld D
2
whether a plaintext/ciphertext pair can be obtained. If D
2
is predictable data (including a null string), the plaintext/ciphertext pair is ex-
posed. IfD
2
includes some unpredictable data not supplied inD
1
, it depends only
on the structure of the cryptographic operation whether the plaintext/ciphertext
pair is exposed.
In both the second protocol based on digital signature and the third protocol
based on CCF, D
2
cannot be unpredictable for B, otherwise B cannot verify the
signature and the cryptographic check value respectively. Those two protocols
expose plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Observe dierent time variant parameters based authentication protocols
without an unpredictable optional text eld placed in the cryptographically
protected part of the token. In timestamp or sequence number based proto-
cols, it is rather dicult to avoid disclosure of plaintext/ciphertext pairs, since
the intruder can choose when to start the protocol or what predictable num-
ber is used in the protocol. When using an unpredictable nonce, the nonce has
to be cryptographically protected in order to prevent the protocol disclosing a
plaintext/ciphertext pair. The following examples of unilateral authentication
protocols, which do not disclose plaintext/ciphertext pairs, do not depend on
the predictability of D
1
, D
2
and D
3
.
Example 4: Symmetric encryption with nonce:
M
1
: B ! A : E
K
AB
(R
B
; D
1
)
M
2
: A! B : D
3
; E
K
AB
(R
B
; B;D
2
)
Example 5: Digital signature and asymmetric encipherment with nonce:
M
1
: A! B : E
B
(R
A
; B;D
1
; S
A
(R
A
; B;D
2
))
Example 6: CCF with nonces:
M
1
: A! B : R
A
; B;D
1
; F
K
AB
(R
A
; B;D
2
) R
0
A
; F
K
AB
(R
0
A
; D
3
)
Note that the rst nonce R
A
in Example 6 can be replaced by a timestamp T
A
or sequence number N
A
.
8 Using poorly synchronised clocks
The authentication protocols with timestamps specied in ISO/IEC 9798 require
the communicating parties to have synchronised clocks. There are several ap-
proaches to achieving secure clock synchronisation and re-synchronisation (e.g.,
[19, 20, 16]). However, in some environments, time stamp based protocols need
to be used although the parties do not have exactly synchronised clocks. For
example, in a mobile telecommunications system, a mobile user may nd it di-
cult to keep a clock synchronised with the clock of its service provider. The user
and network may still wish to use a timestamp-based authentication protocol
rather than a nonce-based one to reduce the number of messages exchanged, and
to allow the detection of forced delays.
Two points must be considered when using a timestamp-based protocol in
such an environment. Firstly the size of the acceptance window to match poorly
synchronised clocks must be selected. The size of this window can be either
xed or dynamically changed depending on the environment, in particular on
the delays in the communications channels and the quality of the clocks in use.
Secondly all messages within the current acceptance window must be logged,
and second and subsequent occurrences of identical messages within that window
must be rejected (see Annex B of [3] and [15]).
9 Summary
This paper discusses how the properties of underlying mechanisms aect the
design of authentication protocols and how to tailor authentication protocols to
match underlying mechanisms. A number of alternatives to the ISO/IEC 9798
protocols, which do not put such strict conditions on the underlying mechanisms,
have been proposed and analysed. We now summarise them as follows.
 If authentication servers are not trusted by clients individually, three possible
approaches are: (1) allowing clients to choose trustworthy servers, (2) using
a set of moderately trusted servers instead of a single one, (3) using o-line
master servers.
 In order to preserve entity identity privacy, two possible methods are: (1)
based on asymmetric cryptography the entity identity can be hidden by using
the public part of the receiver's asymmetric key pair, (2) one or more tem-
porary entity identities instead of the real entity identity can be transmitted
unencrypted.
 In order to avoid abuse of digital signatures, four possible approaches are: (1)
let the signer generate an unpredictable nonce and insert the nonce into the
signed message, (2) use dierent keys for dierent applications, (3) use se-
quence numbers rather than unpredictable nonces to control the uniqueness
of authentication exchanges, (4) use zero knowledge techniques.
 When using a predictable nonce as a challenge, all messages, both the chal-
lenge and response, have to be protected cryptographically. Some possible
examples are: (1) in a symmetric encryption based protocol, the challenge
and response are respectively a nonce and a function of the nonce encrypted
by the shared key, (2) in a digital signature based protocol, the private parts
of the challenger's and responder's asymmetric key pairs are used in the chal-
lenge and response respectively, (3) in a CCF based protocol, the challenge
is a nonce concatenated with a CCF of the nonce, and the response is a CCF
of a function of the nonce.
 In unpredictable nonce based protocols without unpredictable optional text
elds it is possible to avoid disclosing plaintext/ciphertext pairs by using
cryptographic protection for every message. In timestamp or sequence num-
ber based protocols without unpredictable optional text elds, it appears to
be rather dicult to avoid giving plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
 When using poorly synchronised clocks in authentication protocols, one ap-
proach is to take the following steps: (1) select the size of the acceptance
window to match the poorly synchronised clocks, (2) log all messages and
reject the second and subsequent occurrences of identical messages within
the acceptance window.
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